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A. Introduction  
‘Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on […] respect for universal funda-
mental ethical principles.’1 This statement as the first fundamental principle of the 
Olympic Charter perfectly reflects the need for an international legal regulation of 
the globalized professional sport. 
I. The development of sport and its special features 
The development of globalisation in different areas of life also expanded the scope of 
competition in sport. The internationality of sport raised its economic relevance and 
therefore its commercial impact. These developments can be observed in several 
fields. Especially in popular sports like football, the amounts of money that are paid 
for the services of single athletes increase continuously. The Brazilian football star 
Neymar Junior, who was recently transferred from Barcelona to Paris for a total 
amount of €408 million2 and earns €450 million during his five years of contract 
with Paris Saint German3 illustrates the extreme financial interests in sports nowa-
days. Expensive sponsoring activities of global business companies like Red Bull, 
Volkswagen and many others, whose business activities do not concern sport at all, 
confirm this evaluation of international professional sport. The existence of these 
diverse international interests in the results of competitions and their underlying de-
cisions as well as the variety of disciplines of different sports require a strict univer-
sal regulation.  
Besides the internationality, another special characteristic attribute of sport is its fast-
moving nature. Several decisions regarding the special rules of sport immediately 
affect the course of the game in question and therefore must be made rapidly and 
without delay in order to maintain the entertainment value for the audience. Further-
more, the set of rules regulating the different disciplines often requires a very specif-
ic knowledge and expertise.  
For these reasons the law concerning sport and its unique features is predominantly 
dealt with by courts of arbitration rather than state courts. Sports law covers all the 
                                                
1 Olympic Charter, Fundamental Principles available at 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
2 €222 million transfer fee + €46 million taxes + €100 million bounty for Neymar + €40 million boun-
ty for Neymar. 
3 €90 million a year including taxes.  
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law governing the practice of sports4 and was in 1949 already referred to as the only 
case of a birth and formation of an independent and complex legal system in modern 
times5. The scope of involved parties reaches from athletes and team owners to 
agents, advertisers as well as journalists and media outlets. 
 
II. Outline of this dissertation 
This dissertation examines the system and history of arbitration in sport, assessing its 
benefits, problems and potential. It reveals and considers the special features of 
sports and the consequential needs for the way of dispute settlement in this area.  For 
this purpose, at first a brief overview about the concept of arbitration in general is 
given, followed by an objective description of the history and structure of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport as the most important dispute settlement body in sports. By 
reference to these ascertained developments regarding its composition and operation, 
the quality of the Court of Arbitration for Sport will be evaluated and its common 
criticism will be analysed in detail.  
Moreover, in this context, the necessity of state control for sports arbitration will be 
revealed, making specific reference to a main case study of Claudia Pechstein vs. the 
International Skating Union which will help to illustrate the manifestations of the 
acquired problems and their context in practice. The case study thereby also reveals 
the different approaches of the various courts that dealt with the case and hence 
serves to reflect on their assessments. For these reasons, the case of Claudia Pech-
stein will be studied in detail, starting with the background of the case and illuminat-
ing all the judicial proceedings from the Court of Arbitration for Sport up to the Fed-
eral Supreme Court of Germany.  
The thesis then examines whether the found results also apply from South African 
perspective and hence can be transferred to South African law as well. Finally, it 
attempts an outlook in respect of the future of arbitration in international sports. To 
this effect, the dissertation tries to provide solutions for the problems of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport by considering the interests of all involved parties and thereby 
lend credence to the respective arbitral judgements. 
                                                
4 Michael Beloff, Tim Kerr, Marie Demetriou, Sports Law (1999) 5. 
5 Giannini, Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport (1949) 10, 17. 
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B. The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
I. The concept of arbitration 
Arbitration in general is a peaceful way of dispute resolution by a third person. The 
legal term, however, ‘signifies an institution which consists in the settlement of a 
certain category of disputes by judges who are chosen by the litigants’6. The settle-
ment of disputes by arbitration has prevailed since ancient times. The first transmis-
sion of an arbitral trial is found in Homer’s Iliad and deals with a dispute about the 
inequality of the shields of Achilles, Aeas and Archilochos during festival games. 
The question of wining by illegal means was settled through arbitration7 which con-
firms the practicality of this way of dispute settlement in term of sports. This practice 
of resolving disputes between athletes during the games carried on and can be found 
in Homer's Odyssey8 as well. 
Regarding international law, arbitration means the method of settlement of interna-
tional disputes by bringing the dispute to a third party who is empowered to decide 
with binding effect for the involved parties. In a broader understanding, international 
arbitration also comprises all judicial types which are excluded from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the international or the national courts and instead are chosen by the 
consent of the opposing parties.9 Whilst judicial decisions are made by an already 
existing and prescribed system, the composition and structure of the panel of arbitra-
tion can be agreed on by the parties of the dispute. Therefore, an agreement between 
the parties is required which determines the organisation and procedure of the deci-
sion-making. In contrast to other methods of dispute settlement, as for example me-
diation, the settlement through a judgement of an arbitral panel must always be based 
on the application and interpretation of law. 
 
II. The history of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
1. The establishment of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in 1984 
                                                
6 Ioannou, K & Perrakis, S ‘Introduction in International Justice’ (1984) Tetradia International Law, 
123. 
7 Homer Iliad 573-610.  
8 Homer Odyssey 97-258. 
9 Ioannou, K & Perrakis, S op cit note 6, 123-24.  
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Whilst various sport disputes like questions regarding the Olympic Games for exam-
ple, refer to the Olympic Charter or to statues of national and international sport as-
sociations, a great number of unusual disputes cannot be categorized this easily and 
hence do not come within the jurisdiction of an institution of the Olympic Move-
ment. This ambiguity and the earlier described process of globalisation with its re-
sulting internationality of sport raised the question of the appropriate forum for legal 
proceedings regarding international as well as unclassified sport disputes. In order to 
achieve legal certainty and equal treatment of all athletes and to prevent the oppor-
tunity of ‘forum shopping’ as well as state control through ordinary state courts, the 
International Olympic Committee decided to create the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
as a universal, uniform and specialised arbitral court for sports law.10  
The idea to establish such a tribunal came up for the first time in the Olympic Con-
gress in Baden-Baden in 1981 by the President of the International Olympic Com-
mittee, H.E. Juan Antonio Samaranch and was approved by the International Olym-
pic Committee in Rome 1982.11 In 1983, the International Olympic Committee for-
mally ratified the statutes of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in New Delhi, which 
entered force on 30 June 1984.12  
The Court of Arbitration for Sport is located at the headquarters of the International 
Olympic Committee in Lausanne, Switzerland and held its first arbitration proceed-
ings in 1986. According to article 5 of the Statute for the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport the following parties qualify to submit a case to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, if they can prove a legitimate interest: the International Olympic Committee 
International Olympic Committee, National Olympic Committees , International 
School Sport Federations, Organizing Committees for Olympic Games, sports asso-
ciations, national federations, ‘and in a general way, any natural person or corporate 
body having the capacity or power to compromise’.13  
However, the Court of Arbitration for Sport struggled to gain acceptance especially 
from those for whom it seemed to have been established. One of the reasons was that 
it was totally financed by the International Olympic Committee. Moreover, the Pres-
                                                
10 Louise Reilly ‘An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & the Role of National 
Courts in International Sports Disputes’ (2012) Journal of Dispute Resolution 63. 
11 Bruno Simma ‘The Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (2006), Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C R Siekmann 
and Janwillem Soek (eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 21 
12 http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html 
13 Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, art. 5, reprinted in James A.R. Nafziger International-
Sports Law (1988) at 221. 
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ident of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was chosen by the president of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee and had to be a member of the International Olympic 
Committee. This dependence on the International Olympic Committee kept many 
athletes and other potential parties away from submitting their cases to an unfamiliar 
and obscure jurisdiction.14  
In order to entrench its jurisdiction by anchoring pre-formulated arbitration clauses 
into the statutes of the national and international federations, the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport published a Guide to Arbitration15, which tried to incorporate the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport as the appellate body for the decisions of the federations' disci-
plinary tribunals. Yet, the scepticism of the federations was too big to simply adopt 
these clauses as the Court of Arbitration for Sport was still not totally accepted as an 
undoubted independent panel. The fact that the statute of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport could not be modified without a resolution of the International Olympic Com-
mittee increased this suspicion.16 
 
2. The establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
In consequence of the lack of independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
from the International Olympic Committee many decisions of the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport were challenged by athletes.17 One of them was the German horse rider 
Gundel who originally appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport regarding to an 
International Equestrian Federation (FEI) horse-doping decision, which had suspend-
ed and fined him.18 The tribunal of the Court of Arbitration for Sport confirmed the 
decision of the FEI with the result that Gundel brought the Case to the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal claiming that the Court of Arbitration for Sport was not an independent 
court of arbitration under Swiss law.19 
                                                
14 Darren Kane ‘Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (2003) 4 Mel-
bourne Journal of International Law 611, 614; Richard McLaren, ‘A New Order: Athlete's Rights and 
the Court of Arbitration at the Olympic Games’ (1998) 7 Olympika: The International Journal of 
Olympic Studies 1, 5. 
15 Court of Arbitration for Sports, Guide to Arbitration (1991).	
16 Code of Sports-related Arbitration, s 8(2). 
17 Darren Kane op cit note 14. 
18 Gilbert Schwaar 'CAS' (1993) 309 Olympic Review 305, 305. 
19 Richard H. McLaren ‘Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Look in the Rear-
View Mirror’ (2010) 20 Marquette Sports Law Review 305. 
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Although the decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal ruled that the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport was a ‘true arbitral tribunal’20 and independent from the FEI, it con-
tained a landmark statement which indicated that the independence of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport would be very doubtful as soon as the International Olympic 
Committee itself became an involved party in proceedings before the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport. This statement caused several reforms of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport 21 which were approved with the signing of the ‘Agreement concerning the 
Constitution of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport’ on 22 June 1994 in 
Paris, known as the ‘Paris Agreement’22. The major alteration provided by the agree-
ment was the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
(ICAS) in 1994, which was created to organise, finance and control the Court of Ar-
bitration for Sport independently from the International Olympic Committee. In gen-
eral, in consequence of the Gundel decision and its containing statement about the 
independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the whole organisation of the 
tribunal was reconstructed in order to ensure its independence from all kinds of po-
tential influences.23 The new structure and organisation of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport and the International Council of Arbitration for Sport will be described in 
the following chapter.   
 
III. The organisation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
1. Divisions and jurisdiction  
Besides the above-mentioned creation of the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport, the reform mainly concerned the structure and proceeding of the Court of Ar-
bitration for Sport. Although numerous procedural rules of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport remained the same, some important changes were made. Firstly, the tribu-
nal was divided into the Ordinary Arbitration Division and the Appeals Arbitration 
Division. The Ordinary Arbitration Division deals with first instance disputes which 
are based on a valid arbitral agreement between the involved parties. In general, it 
                                                
20 G v Federation Equestre Internationale (1993) Digest of CAS Awards I 561-70. 
21 The restructuring of the CAS was approved with the signing of the Agreement Concerning the Con-
stitution of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport in June 1994.  
22 Agreement Concerning the Constitution of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
(ICAS), 22 June 1994. 
23 Richard H. McLaren op cit note 19. 
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addresses sports-related contractual disputes for example regarding sponsoring or the 
distribution of TV rights.24  
The Appeals Arbitration Procedure concerns appeals challenging decisions by disci-
plinary bodies of the national or international federations which incorporated an 
Court of Arbitration for Sport arbitration clause in their statute regarding appeals 
against their disciplinary decisions such as doping suspensions or disputes concern-
ing transfers of athletes from one Club to another.25 In this regard, the term ‘Appeals’ 
is quite misleading as the procedure constitutes a first instance decision by the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport rather than an internal legal remedy.  
Moreover, the Court of Arbitration for Sport started to offer an additional way of 
dispute settlement by way of mediation, which has been used only once until now.26 
Apart from that, another change of the procedure of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport was the limitation of the availability of the ‘advisory opinion procedure’. From 
1994 on, this practice was no longer offered on an existing dispute that could also be 
brought before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Furthermore, the opportunity to 
request such an opinion about the interpretation of incompatibility of the regulations 
of a National Olympic Committees or of the International Olympic Committee was 
from now on only reserved for the International Olympic Committee, International 
Federations, National Olympic Committees and the Organising Committees for the 
Olympic Games.27 
Besides these changes of the procedures of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, its 
structure was predominantly changed by the creation of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport, whose establishment - according to the Code of Sports-Related 
Arbitration (Court of Arbitration for Sport Code) - was the principal measure to 
guarantee the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the rights of the 
parties.28 To fulfil its task to protect the rights of the parties, the International Coun-
cil of Arbitration for Sport is empowered to create regional as well as so called ‘ad 
hoc’ divisions.29 Whilst the introduction of the former serves to expand the presence 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport outside of Europe, the latter are established in 
                                                
24 Corina Luck Arbitration in Football: Issues and Problems highlighted by FIFA`s Experiences with 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (2004) 4. 
25 Supra note 16, s 20.  
26 Darren Kane op cit note 14. 
27 'Advisory Opinions' (2002) Digest of CAS Awards II 697. 
28 Supra note 16, s 2, s 6(5)(1)-(5)(3). 
29 Supra note 16, s 6(8). 
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accordance with the host of a certain event like the Olympic games in order to fulfil 
the need for a local, fast acting body during games so as to ensure the effective legal 
protection of the athletes during the games.30 
 
2. Composition 
Section 4 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Code reads as follows:  
 
‘ICAS is composed of twenty members, experienced jurists appointed in the following man-
ner: 
1. four members are appointed by the International Federations (IFs), viz. three by the 
Association of Summer Olympic IFs (ASOIF) and one by the Association of the 
Winter Olympic IFs (AIOWF), chosen from within or outside their membership; 
2. four members are appointed by the Association of the National Olympic Committees 
(ANOC), chosen from within or outside its membership; 
3. four members are appointed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), chosen 
from within or outside its membership; 
4. four members are appointed by the twelve members of ICAS listed above, after ap-
propriate consultation with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes; 
5. four members are appointed by the sixteen members of ICAS listed above, chosen 
from among personalities independent of the bodies designating the other members 
of the ICAS.’ 
 
Summarized, twelve out of the twenty jurists of which the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport consists, are elected by the International Federations, National 
Olympic Committees and the International Olympic Committee (each elect four). 
These twelve members subsequently elect four more members ‘chosen after appro-
priate consultations with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes’31. Final-
ly, the 16 already elected members chose the last four jurists ‘from among personali-
ties independent of the bodies designating the other members of the ICAS’.32 These 
twenty members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport then again elect 
the President of the Court of Arbitration for Sport after consultation with the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee, the Association of Summer Olympic International Feder-
                                                




ations, the Association of the Winter Olympic International Federations and the As-
sociation of the National Olympic Committees.33  
The members of the Court of Arbitration for Sport are elected by the members of the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport in the same ratios as the latter are 
elected.34 At any one time, there are at least 150 members included by the list of arbi-
trators for the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which are appointed for a renewable 
term of four years.35 
The particular formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport which holds the judi-
cial proceeding, normally consists of three arbitrators unless the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport in the face of the nature and importance of the specific case considers a 
single arbitrator appropriate or the parties agree on it. 
If the panel consists of three arbitrators, each of the parties chooses one of them out 
of the pre-existing list of arbitrators. In the Ordinary Arbitration Division, the third 
arbitrator is chosen by agreement of the two designated arbitrators as the president of 
the panel or if they do not come to an agreement, chosen by the President of the Or-
dinary Arbitration Division. Under a procedure of the Appeals Arbitration Division, 
the President of the Division directly chooses the president of the panel.  
 
IV. Problems and criticism 
Although the Court of Arbitration for Sport is widely accepted as the highest sports 
tribunal, it is heavily criticized at the same time. Especially the athletes for whom the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport seemed to have been established do not feel them-
selves represented. This scepticism is mainly based on three points of criticism, 
namely the lack of independence and impartiality of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, the difficulties regarding the enforcement of the Court’s awards and the man-
datory nature of the pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The validity of these three argu-
ments will be evaluated in this chapter.  
 
1. The independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
                                                
33 Supra note 16, s 6(2).  
34 Supra note 16, s 14. 
35 Supra note 16, s 13. 
 10 
One of the basic principles of arbitration in general is the independence and impar-
tiality of the arbitrator.36 All of the most widely accepted international arbitration 
rule-making bodies - like the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the London 
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) - provide rules emphasizing the im-
portance of impartial and independent arbitrators.37 Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights even explicitly determines that the principle of inde-
pendence and impartiality of the court is part of the right to a fair trial38 which in-
cludes arbitral courts39 as well. This principle serves not only to ensure the independ-
ence of the arbitral procedure and the impartiality of its panel in the form of the par-
ticular formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport but also contains an institu-
tional component.40 Therefore, the Court of Arbitration for Sport as an institution has 
to be independent and impartial.  
 
a) Statements of the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
The independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was firstly examined by the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal. According to the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, a deci-
sion of the Court of Arbitration for Sport is final and binding on the parties, subject 
only to judicial review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.41 Therefore, an award of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport can be subject of a challenge by one of the parties at 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which is based in Lausanne as well.42 Article 190(2) of 
the Swiss Federal Code of Private International Law sets the very limited scope for 
the possibility to challenge such a decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: 
 
‘The award may only be annulled: 
a) if the sole arbitrator was not properly appointed or if the arbitral tribunal was not properly 
constituted; 
b) if the arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted or declined jurisdiction; 
c) if the arbitral tribunal's decision went beyond the claims submitted to it, or failed to decide one of 
                                                
36 Alan Redern & Martin Hunter Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (1991) 
218. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
39 Frowein & Peukert Europäische Menschenrechts Konvention EMRK-Kommentar (2009) 150. 
40 Ibid. 
41 General Information about the CAS available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited 7 February 2018).  
42 R Cloete Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) 216. 
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the items of the claim; 
d) if the principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right of the parties to be heard was violated; 
e) if the award is incompatible with public policy.’ 
 
The above mentioned German horse rider Gundel brought his case to the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal questioning the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in 
consequence of its decision regarding his doping suspension43. In this way, he urged 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal to examine the issues of independence.44 At this time the 
links between the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the International Olympic 
Committee were too obvious to deny a close relationship between them as the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport was founded and funded only by the International Olympic 
Committee. Furthermore, the President of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was cho-
sen by the president of the International Olympic Committee among the members of 
the latter and the statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport could not be modified 
without a suggestion of the International Olympic Committee.45 However, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal considered the Court of Arbitration for Sport to be sufficiently in-
dependent and impartial ‘true arbitral tribunal’.46 Nevertheless, it indicated concerns 
regarding the independence and impartiality for cases in which the International 
Olympic Committee itself became an involved party.47 As these concerns were main-
ly based on the direct financial and structural links between the International Olym-
pic Committee and the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the International Olympic 
Committee as an reaction interposed the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport as an financing and controlling body in order to remove the doubts about the 
independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 
 
b) Progress through the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
In consequence of the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport and the related structural reforms, the Court of Arbitration for Sport enjoyed 
even more approval by the Swiss Federal Tribunal which held that the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport was independent enough to consider it ‘more akin to a judicial au-
                                                
43 Supra note 20.  
44 Richard H. McLaren op cit note 19. 
45 Supra note 13.  
46 Supra note 20. 
47 Richard H. McLaren op cit note 19. 
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thority independent of the parties’48 and its decisions ‘true awards, equivalent to the 
judgements of state courts’49. Although these statements indicated that further chal-
lenges of the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport based on a lack of inde-
pendence would most likely be rejected, several athletes like the suspended Chinese 
swimmers50 and the Azerbaijan field hockey team51 tried to overrule the tribunal’s 
reasoning. In these cases, it was held that ‘even the manifestly wrong application of a 
rule of law or the obviously incorrect finding of a point of fact is still not sufficient to 
justify revocation for breach of public policy of an award made in international arbi-
tration proceedings’52 and that the Swiss Federal Tribunal ‘does not review whether 
the arbitration court applied the law, upon which it based its decision, correctly’53. 
Therefore, the legitimacy and independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was 
expressively confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.  
 
c) Analysis of the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
As the International Olympic Committee created, organized and fully funded the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport until its reform in 1994 there is little doubt that the 
links between the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the International Olympic 
Committee were too strong to accept the Court of Arbitration for Sport as a truly 
independent Court of arbitration by that time. Back then, all of the possible judges 
were chosen either by the International Olympic Committee, International Federa-
tions, National Olympic Committees or the president of the International Olympic 
Committee.54 Therefore, no space was left for the representation of the interests of 
the athletes. In fact, the predominant International Olympic Committee clearly used 
its powerful position as the funder and organizer to look after its own interests rather 
than after those of the athletes. The implementation of International Council of Arbi-
tration for Sport and its related structural changes improved the situation for the ath-
letes in some degree and apparently reduced the links between the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport and the International Olympic Committee. The establishment of the 
                                                
48 A. & B. v IOC (2003) Digest of CAS Awards III 684–88.  
49 Ibid. 
50 N. J. Y. W. v FINA (1999) Digest of CAS Awards II 779 
51 X. v Federation Internationale de Hockey (2008), 4A_424/2008.   
52 Supra note 50.  
53 X. v Federation Internationale de Hockey supra note 51 at 6. 
54 Stephen A Kaufmann ‘Issues in International Sports Arbitration’ (1995) 13 Boston University In-
ternational Law Journal 527. 
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International Council of Arbitration for Sport served to prevent direct influence by 
the International Olympic Committee. An example for the improved separation be-
tween the different institutions is the prohibition for the member of the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport to serve as arbitrators at the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport or to act as council for any of the parties.55 However, despite these improve-
ments coming along with the establishment of the International Council of Arbitra-
tion for Sport, not all doubts about the independence of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport have been removed.  
 
aa) The composition of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
The supposedly independent International Council of Arbitration for Sport is not at 
all free of influence by the International Olympic Committee. In fact, the above illus-
trated process of the composition of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
is dominated by the significant influence of the four members elected by the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee itself and the other eight members elected by sport fed-
erations and associations. These totalled twelve members then again elect the re-
maining eight members including only four members which are not allowed to come 
from one of the sport federations. Therefore, all of the members of the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport including even the only four ostensibly ‘independent’ 
members are indirectly chosen by the federations and associations.  
In contrast to this, there is still no guarantee for the representation of the athletes’ 
interests. Art S4(d) of the Code states that four members of the International Council 
of Arbitration for Sport are elected 'after appropriate consultation with a view to 
safeguarding the interests of the athletes',56 but even these ostensibly ‘athlete-
friendly’ members are chosen by the pre-elected members chosen by the sport federa-
tions and associations. Besides that, the provision of Art S4(d) of the Code is too 
uncertain and vague to ensure the athletes’ representation. The wording of the provi-
sion does not determine the exact extent of these ‘consultations’ and even leaves open 
the possibility to ignore the athletes’ suggestions as these are not binding.  
 
bb) The composition of the panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
                                                
55 R H McLaren ‘The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World's Sports 
Disputes’ (2000-2001) 35 Valparaiso University Law Review 379, 83. 
56 Supra note 16, s 4(d). 
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Regarding a legal proceeding, the athlete party to a dispute may choose one of the 
three arbitrators of the particular formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport but 
only out of the pre-existing list of arbitrators on which he had no direct influence and 
which is rather created by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport, directly 
and indirectly appointed by the federations and organisations as seen above. Even if 
the athlete manages to find an impartial arbitrator in that list of arbitrators, he is most 
certainly still confronted with a federation or organisation inclined second arbitrator 
chosen by his opponent. But even if this procedure of appointment results in a panel 
of two unbiased arbitrators or at least two arbitrators with directly opposite and thus 
balanced predispositions and attitudes, the unbalanced International Council of Arbi-
tration for Sport still maintains indirect influence on the bias of the panel. Whilst in 
an Appeals Arbitration Procedure the third member and president of the formation is 
chosen directly by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport, in a procedure 
at the Ordinary Arbitration Division the president of the panel is agreed on by the 
two already appointed arbitrators or if they cannot agree, by the president of the divi-
sion as well. As (at best) the two party appointed arbitrators balance out they will 
most certainly not agree on the third member of the panel, so that this member as its 
president will in almost any case be appointed by the president of the respective divi-
sion of the Court of Arbitration for Sport which is elected by the federation-elected 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport. Needless to say, that the president of 
the panel will decide the dispute if the two other arbitrators cannot find a consensus. 
In this context Straubel noted that  
 
‘with two votes potentially predetermined, this leaves the panel President to break the dead-
lock. Then, because the panel President plays the critical tie-breaking role, his appointment 
becomes, perhaps, the pivotal event in deciding who wins the case.’57 
 
Therefore, the indirect impact of the federations and organisations on the appoint-
ment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport not only continues to have 
an effect on the exclusive list of arbitrators of the Court of Arbitration for Sport but 
also on the particular formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and as illustrat-
ed possibly even on its bias. 
                                                
57 Michael Straubel ‘Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport Can Do Its Job Better’ (2005) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Vol 36   1235. 
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cc) The funding of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Since the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport no longer receives its entire funding from the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee. Instead the International Olympic Committee, the Inter-
national Federations, and the National Olympic Committees each contribute one 
third of the funding.58 However, looking like a balanced system, it is still a one-sided 
system of funding as the entire amount is provided by the Olympic governing bodies.  
 
dd) Conclusion about the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
In summary, the improvements regarding the independence and impartiality of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport have been a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, 
the reforms mainly aimed to safeguard the acceptance of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport as an independent court of arbitration and to maintain its own jurisdiction. 
From the viewpoint of the International Olympic Committee the implemented 
changes might have been the lesser evil compared to a denial of the independent sta-
tus of the Court of Arbitration for Sport by the international legal community. To 
prevent such a denial and the associated total loss of influence on the legal sport-
proceedings, the International Olympic Committee rather dropped its direct and ob-
vious influence to some degree by pretending to aim for a completely independent 
and ‘athlete-friendly’ court of arbitration. By taking a closer view to the implemented 
rules, the factual imbalanced power structure in favour of the International Olympic 
Committee and other federations reveals. In this context, one should bear in mind 
that the Court of Arbitration for Sport may no longer be exclusively dominated by 
the International Olympic Committee but that the composition and structure favours 
the interests of the sport organisations and federations in general which are most 
commonly of the same nature. A single athlete who is challenging a decision of such 
a federation before the Court of Arbitration for Sport apparently has a clear competi-
tive disadvantage right from the start. The ostensibly structural changes hence turn 
out to be of a hypocritical nature in whose consequence against the findings of the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal the Court of Arbitration for Sport remains linked to the sport-
                                                
58 Supra note 22. 
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institutions and after all cannot be considered as a truly independent court of arbitra-
tion.  
 
2. The enforcement of the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport  
Besides its lack of independence, the Court of Arbitration for Sport is also often crit-
icized for difficulties regarding the enforcement of its awards. To facilitate the en-
forcement of international arbitral awards in general, the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards59, also referred to as the New York 
Convention, was adopted by a United Nations diplomatic conference on 10 June 
1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959.60 By now, it has been ratified by 157 
states.61 The New York Convention has been called ‘the single most important pillar 
on which the edifice of international arbitration rests’62 and ‘perhaps could lay claim 
to be the most effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of 
commercial law.’63 
A state which is party to the convention is required to acknowledge private arbitral 
agreements as well as to recognize and enforce arbitration awards from other con-
tracting states.64 The Convention is highly esteemed as it ensures a quite uncompli-
cated way of gaining recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.65 Nev-
ertheless, it contains some exceptions to this general rule of which the most im-
portant are examined in the following: 
 
a) Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention 
Article V(1)(e) of the Convention states that at the request of the party against whom 
it is invoked, domestic courts may refuse to enforce an award ‘if that party furnishes 
to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof 
that: (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
                                                
59 The New York Arbitration Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, New York, 10 June 1958 
60 Wikipedia: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Wetter ‘The Present Status of International Court of Arbitration of the ICC’ (1990) 1 American 
Review of International Arbitration 91.  
63 Mustill ‘Arbitration: History and Background’ (1989) 6 Journal of International Arbitration 43. 
64 Supra note 60. 
65 Stephen A Kaufmann op cit note 54, 537. 
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which, that award was made’.66 Therefore, the enforcement of the award of  Court of 
Arbitration for Sport could be refused by a domestic court if the defendant manages 
to successfully challenge the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in front of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal and hence annul the award. Thus, the critical question is, 
whether the Swiss Federal Tribunal recognizes the validity of the decisions of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport.67 Until 1993 it remained uncertain how the Swiss 
courts would judge in this matter. No certainty that the awards of the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport could be enforced at the home state of the award holder was given. 
However, as previously illustrated, in March 1993 the Swiss Federal Tribunal had to 
decide the Gundel case in which it dealt with the recognition of the validity of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport and its awards. As even in this case and hence before 
the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport and its related 
structural reforms, the Tribunal considered the Court of Arbitration for Sport to be a 
‘true arbitral tribunal’68 it seems very unlikely that a Swiss Court will annul an award 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport because of its lack of independence.69 Instead, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal subsequent to the reforms of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport in 1994 held that the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport constitute 
‘true awards, equivalent to the judgements of State courts’70. Hence, in the face of the 
Gundel decision the fulfilment of the requirements of article V(1)(e) in terms of the 
annulment of an award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport will be very hard to 
achieve. 
 
b) Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention 
Another important exception to the enforcement of an award of the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport is article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention which states that ‘an 
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (b) The recognition or enforcement 
of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country’.71 The possibility 
                                                
66 New York Convention, supra note 59, art. V(1)(e). 
67 Stephen A Kaufmann op cit note 54, 539. 
68 G v Federation Equestre Internationale supra note 20 at 561. 
69 Stephen A Kaufmann op cit note 54, 539; Maureen A Weston ‘Simply a Dress Rehearsal? U.S. 
Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (2009) 38 
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to refuse the enforcement of an otherwise binding arbitral award based on the public 
policy argument is one of the most important exceptions to the general rule of recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. 
Its importance as well as its controversial discussion is caused by its uncertain scope 
and the fact that its application is totally dependent upon the laws of individual 
states.72 In consequence, the binding effect of the New York Convention is relatively 
loose and can easily be circumvented as its extent is always dependent on state laws 
which can even be passed in the aftermath. Moreover, the Convention does not give 
any definition for the meaning of the term ‘public policy’ and hence leaves the inter-
pretation of its scope open to the national courts which therefore vary in their under-
standing of the term.73 
These non-uniform interpretations are not only inconsistent with the introductory 
first fundamental principle of the Olympic Charter74 but also contravene with the 
actual goal of the New York Convention, namely to achieve a uniform recognition 
and enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
To establish a universal and uniform understanding of the term, the International 
Law Association (ILA) tried to prepare a concept of international public policy but 
failed to reach a consent as to what should constitute international public policy.75 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the legal uncertainty of the wording, the ‘interpretation 
and application of the public policy exception in most jurisdictions is usually on the 
side of enforcement which is referred to as the pro-enforcement bias. Pro-
enforcement itself is seen as a public policy.’76 One of the most significant national 
court decisions regarding this pro-enforcement bias is the decision of the Slaney case 
by the Seventh Circuit,77 in which the U.S. middle-distance runner Mary Decker 
Slaney challenged the arbitral award of the International Amateur Athletic Federa-
tion which confirmed her doping-violation because of increased levels of testos-
                                                
72 Sameer Sattar ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Public Policy: Same concept, different ap-
proach?’ (2011) 4 Vol. 8(5) Transnational Dispute Management Journal. 
73 Ibid. 
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75 O Ozumba ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Does the Public Policy Exception Create Inconsisten-
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76 Ibid.  
77 Slaney v. International Athletic Amateur Athletic Federation and the United States Olympic Com-
mittee (2001) 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir.), 534 U.S. 828. 
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terone.78 Slaney was claiming that such a doping violation would be contrary to U.S. 
public policy by ‘presuming she had committed a doping offense based on a test that 
is scientifically invalid and discriminatory towards female athletes’.79 The Seventh 
Circuit held that the New York Convention's public policy exception is ‘exceedingly 
narrow’80 as it requires a violation of ‘the most basic notions of morality and justice’81 
and that its enforcement needs to ‘entail a violation of a paramount legal principle 
that is ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and from general 
considerations of supposed public interests’.82 In accordance with the pro-
enforcement bias, Slaney's claim was rejected. Therefore, provided that such an in-
ternational pro-enforcement bias will consistently be retained, the public policy ex-
ception under article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention will neither significantly 
interfere the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 
Ultimately, as a result of the illustrated Gundel decision on the one hand and the pro-
enforcement bias on the other hand, the enforcement of an award of the Court of Ar-
bitration for Sport does not carry unreasonable risks for the succeeding party. 
 
3. The voluntary nature of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
In order to control the jurisdiction of sport related disputes, sport associations and 
federations try to avoid national or state controlled courts for such proceedings.83 An 
often-alleged reasoning for this effort is the need for a fast, effective and expert dis-
pute settlement body. As explained above the special features of sport and its legal 
questions indeed require such a special handling. Nevertheless, this goal cannot be 
pursued at all costs. General principles like the guarantee of access to justice as well 
as the principles of arbitration must be considered on the one hand just as the free-
dom of contract on the other hand. All these aspects must be brought into accordance 
equally. 





82 Matthew J. Mitten ‘Judicial Review of Olympic and International Sports Arbitration Awards: 
Trends and Observations’ (2009) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal Vol 10, 63 
83 Jan Paulsson ‘Arbitration of International Sports Disputes’ (1993) Arbitration International Vol 9, 
359–70. 
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To achieve the circumvention of the state controlled courts, sport associations and 
federations usually include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their license contracts.84 
These pre-dispute arbitration clauses for future disputes must be clearly distinguished 
from arbitration agreements for already existing disputes. Whilst the former are often 
agreed to in a situation in which at least one of the parties does not expect the emer-
gence of such a future legal dispute or just does not think about it, the latter is usually 
consented when the dispute is already omnipresent for the parties and hence based on 
a conscious decision. Therefore, the pre-dispute arbitration clauses are much more 
problematic and require a precise review.  
As a matter of fact, such a pre-dispute arbitration clause is often just one of multiple 
provisions of an extensive contract which for most athletes is very hard to overview. 
Especially when included in a license contract, athletes might overlook them or just 
ignore their meaning as they are focussed on receiving their licence. What is more, 
sport federations in most of the cases even insist on the inclusion of such clauses 
which makes them so called ‘mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses’ to be distin-
guished from ‘optional (pre-)dispute arbitration clauses’. This mandatory nature and 
the fact that sport federations have a monopoly position for the professional practic-
ing of their type of sport85, confronts the young athletes with the choice between two 
options: Either to sign the license contract with its pre-dispute arbitration clause in 
order to exercise their sport professionally and live their dream or to refuse to sign 
the contract solely because of an arbitration clause which perhaps would never be 
needed to be applied. The consequences of the second option are obvious: All the 
hard work and long-time of practice, all the strict sacrifices and immense expendi-
tures suddenly turn out to have been completely needless. The dream of international 
competitions, possibly even triumphs, awards, fame and great earnings are no more 
accessible. Instead the athlete finds himself in a helpless situation, maybe even with-
out education for another kind of job. Not to forget that athletes are normally faced 
with this decision in a relatively young age right before their breakthrough and with a 
promising career in prospect. 
In the light of these alternatives the decision of such young athletes in favour of the 
contract and the mandatory arbitration clause comes as no surprise. Even if they rec-
ognize the incorporated waiver of their right to a traditional court, they most certain-
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ly do not understand its consequences or at least just do not care about them in this in 
two respects significant moment for their future.  
Because of this lack of alternatives and the associated imbalance of power of the two 
contracting parties, the question arises whether such mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses can still be considered as in accordance with the principle of voluntari-
ness of arbitration. In the face of the above illustrated predicament, it seems to be 
more than doubtful to consider such a decision as voluntary. The following decisions 
of state courts demonstrate the different interpretations and their requirements for 
this voluntariness. 
 
a) In the case of the doping-suspended Basketball player Stanley Roberts the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal ruled that because of the need for quick, effective and expert deci-
sions the requirement of voluntariness should be interpreted in a broad way as long 
as the independence and impartiality of the institution is guaranteed.86  
Roberts - who neither joined the International Basketball Federation or a subordinat-
ed federation or club nor signed an arbitration agreement - was bound to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Arbitration for Sport just because he tried to challenge a doping 
suspension by the International Basketball Federations which was originally imposed 
by the National Basketball Association of North America.87 In the context of the fed-
eration-internal appeal against the suspension, Roberts had to acknowledge the code 
of procedure of the federation, which in fact contained a referral to the statutes of the 
International Basketball Federation but not explicitly to the contained arbitration 
clause. Nevertheless, the panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as well as the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal ruled that the procedure of Roberts suffices to exclude him 
from traditional courts as the ‘principle of trust’ requires that a federation-internal 
appealing athlete expresses a reservation against the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport if he does not accept it.88 Therefore, even without a direct submis-
sion to an arbitration clause, the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that the requirements 
for arbitration including its voluntariness have been fulfilled which illustrates how 
                                                
86 Stanley Roberts v Federation Internationale de Basketball (2001) 4P.230/2000, reprinted in Bulletin 
ASA 2001, 523. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid.  
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broad this requirement is interpreted. Moreover, the case clarifies the fundamental 
inferiority of the athlete within the monopolistic structure of federations.89 
 
b) In contrast to this, the Regional Court Frankfurt (Landgericht Frankfurt) in 
Germany stated in its ‘London-decision’ that a licence contract containing a mandato-
ry pre-dispute arbitration clause between the German Football Association 
(Deutscher Fußball Bund) and the former first division club ‘FC Homburg’ was inva-
lid due to the fact that the Deutscher Fußball Bund misused its economic and social 
superiority.90 For this reason, the arbitration clause was agreed under compulsion and 
hence involuntarily. Nevertheless, the court also ruled that under German law the FC 
Homburg had a claim for being licensed and that the Deutscher Fußball Bund could 
not insist on the arbitral jurisdiction as this would only be the case if the arbitral ju-
risdiction would be necessary in order to maintain the orderly gaming operations.91 
Since the dispute in the ‘London-decision’ only dealt with questions about the prohi-
bition of certain kinds of shirt-sponsoring and hence did not affect the orderly gam-
ing operations, the arbitration was not held necessary in this sense.92 Therefore, the 
case perfectly illustrates how national courts could possibly handle the problem of 
such mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. However, at the same time it unfor-
tunately does not give an answer to the important question where the interference of 
the gaming operations begins with the consequence that the arbitral jurisdiction 
would be required in order to maintain these orderly gaming operations and thus 
where a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause could be valid.  
 
c) According to an approach in the common-law case law, namely by the Court of 
Appeal of New South Wales93 and the High Court of England94, arbitration clauses 
are consented voluntarily unless the consent is based on ‘undue compulsion’. Since 
the access to the traditional courts up to that point is waived voluntarily, the guaran-
tee of access to justice as well as the principles of arbitration are not contravened.95 
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The mere superiority of one of the parties however, does not by itself constitute such 
an ‘undue compulsion’.  
 
d) Another approach to tackle the mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses is the 
concept of unconscionability.96 Under US-law a contract clause is unconscionable if 
‘in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconsciona-
ble under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract’97 
which requires the ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favourable to the other party’98. 
As illustrated above, the alternatives at choice for the athlete can very well be con-
sidered as a lack of opportunity to make such a meaningful choice. Hence, the crucial 
question becomes, whether the mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause unreasona-
bly favours the organization imposing the agreement or whether the goal of an inter-
nationally uniform, quick, effective and expert decision making body prevails.99 
Therefore, under this approach once again the issue depends on a general balancing 
of interests which must be made on a case-by-case basis. In this context, one must 
bear in mind that the impending arbitral proceeding does not necessarily have to be 
unfair. In fact, the compulsory independence and impartiality of the arbitral proceed-
ing and its remedies should ensure a fair and neutral way of dispute resolution.100   
 
e) Under all the above illustrated approaches for the assessment of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses, the legality of such clauses depends on the particular case    
in question. However, it must be noted that their validity can at most be accepted if 
the subsequent arbitral proceeding fulfils the requirements of independence and im-
partiality. A closer look on the assessment of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses will be taken in the following case study of Claudia Pechstein vs. the Inter-
national Skating Union. 
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C. Case study: Claudia Pechstein vs. the International Skating Union 
In the following chapter the dissertation will make use of a detailed case study of 
Claudia Pechstein vs. the International Skating Union.  
I. The case study methodology 
A case study ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’.101 
For this purpose, the case study method will be used in the following for the analysis 
of the above illustrated legal questions in practice.  
Mostly used in social science, the case study method has been adopted to several 
fields of science including law. A legal case study precisely illustrates the examina-
tion of facts in context and thus often entails additional approaches of how the actors 
grasp the legal phenomena in practice.102 Such an analysis of existent real-life situa-
tions provides a different perspective to a question and calls attention to aspects of 
the issue which in theory do not seem to exist. Thereby, it ‘may help to understand 
how laws are understood, and how and why they are applied and misapplied, sub-
verted, complied with or rejected.’103 As a basis for the application of theoretic ideas 
and academic approaches, the method also serves as a practical inspection of such 
ideas and approaches itself. Moreover, it allows deep insights into specific contem-
porary processes whose conclusions might also be applicable to similar cases and 
whose results might bring solutions for other phenomena as well.104 At best, it can 
even provide requirements under which the so found rule may generally be applied.  
Despite these advantages, the case study methodology does not come without its dif-
ficulties. A common criticism of the method is that its conclusion can be dependent 
on a single subject or case which makes it difficult to generalize its findings.105 For 
this reason Yin raised the question ‘How can you generalise from a single case?’106. 
He considered the case methodology ‘microscopic’ because of the usually limited 
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sampling cases. Therefore, the reliability and generality of its findings and conclu-
sions are subject to scepticism especially when a small sampling is examined.107  
Moreover, a common criticism regarding case studies is its supposed ‘lack of rigour’. 
In this context, Yin notes that ‘too many times, the case study investigator has been 
sloppy, and has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direc-
tion of the findings and conclusions’.108 In consequence of this lack of rigour and the 
uncertainty about the capability to transfer a general conclusion from the possibly 
isolated case, the method is susceptible to biased interpretation of its result. 
Nevertheless, the methodology of case studies is used frequently as it often is the 
only way to create a link between the theoretic assessments and the real-life context.  
Thereby it serves at least to illuminate the difficulties of the examined problem and 
the applicability of the abstract findings in practice. 
It is submitted that the advantages of the case study method prevail over its disad-
vantages. If the above-mentioned risks are recognized in advance, these problems 
can be prevented by choosing a significant case which reflects a general problem 
rather than an individual one.  
In the case of Claudia Pechstein vs. the International Skating Union the enormous 
significance of the decision of the German national courts and especially of the Fed-
eral Supreme Court of Germany was obvious from the start of the dispute. The legal 
sport community as well as the federations themselves were aware of the wide-
ranging signal originating from such a decision. The long-lasting goal of exclusive 
jurisdiction without the national control of traditional courts was at risk. Therefore, 
the case was predestined to create another landmark statement regarding sport arbi-
tration in general comparable to the Gundel. The efforts of sport federations to 
achieve a uniform arbitral system and to include such standardized mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses uniformly and invariably into the license contracts be-
tween the athletes and the federations greatly contributes to the equal legal treatment 
of such agreements. Therefore, the above-mentioned risk to incorrectly generalize 
the findings of an isolated case is reduced so that the Pechstein case can well be used 
in order to clarify the above presented problem of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in the specific context of agreements between athletes and federations.  
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For this purpose, a brief overview of the background facts of the case followed by 
the summarized proceedings will demonstrate in which context the theoretic question 
of the validity of such agreements usually arises and how wide the consequences of 
the answer to this question reach. The different approaches of the particular courts 
will be considered and analysed. Thereby, the scope of the case’s relevance is not 
limited solely to mandatory arbitration clauses but also includes the above discussed 
question of the independence and impartiality of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  
 
II. The background of the case 
The case of the well-known German speed skating star Claudia Pechstein vs. the 
International Skating Union is probably the most discussed dispute about the volun-
tariness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Since the start of her outstand-
ing career in 1988, Pechstein won several medals at World, European and National 
championships as well as five gold and two bronze medals at the Olympics which 
makes her one of the most successful winter sport athletes of all time.109 During the 
World Championships in Norway 2009 the doping control evidenced that Pechstein 
had irregular levels of reticulocytes in her blood which exceeded the permitted max-
imum value. Nevertheless, she was never tested positive as to any forbidden sub-
stances during any of her repeated tests. By that time however, the sole irregular 
blood values sufficed to establish an indirect evidence of doping. In consequence, 
Pechstein as the first athlete ever was suspended for two years based only on the cir-
cumstantial evidence regarding her blood values. Shortly after her suspension the 
rules of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) changed and the possibility of 
such a suspension grounded on indirect evidence only was abolished. Meanwhile, 
various medical experts attest that the irregular levels of reticulocytes in Pechstein’s 
blood were caused by a genetic aberration inherited from her father.110 
In consequence of her doping-suspension, disciplinary proceedings were also initiat-
ed by Pechstein’s employer, the German Federal Police. However, as there was no 
final proof of blood doping the proceedings were stopped. After the refusal of Pech-
stein’s application for unpaid leave in order to be able to continue her training, she 
suffered a nervous breakdown.  
                                                




III. The judicial proceedings 
1. The proceeding at the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
In order to take part in international competitions and tournaments organized by the 
International Skating Union Pechstein initially signed a declaration which excluded 
her from the access to traditional courts and acknowledged the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport for any legal disputes with the International Skating 
Union or its members.111 Additionally, Pechstein signed an athlete-agreement with 
the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft (DESG) containing a mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clause.112 This agreement including the arbitration clause was re-
quired in order to be supported and nominated by the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-
Gemeinschaft for the international competitions of the International Skating Union. 
After her doping-suspension because of the increased blood values, Pechstein as well 
as the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft brought the case to the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport claiming that Pechstein had never doped and that the irregular levels 
of reticulocytes in Pechstein’s blood were caused by the genetic aberration inherited 
from her father. Unsurprisingly, in November 2009 the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
dismissed this appeal and confirmed the suspension, finding no evidence of such an 
inheritance.113  
 
2. The proceeding at the Swiss Federal Tribunal  
Subsequently to the confirmation of her suspension Pechstein attempted to challenge 
the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport at the Swiss Federal Tribunal as 
provided for by the Code of Sports-related Arbitration.114 Pechstein claimed that be-
cause of a new kind of diagnostic analysis developed after the decision of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport her genetic aberration could be proven. Therefore, the deci-
sion of the Court of Arbitration for Sport should be annulled and the case should be 
dealt with by the Court of Arbitration for Sport once again. In fact, such a procedure 
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generally is possible if one of the parties brings forward new evidence which could 
not have been brought to the court in the first place, except from those evidences 
which only occurred after the decision.115 The new medical expert assessments how-
ever, were issued after the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport so that their 
ability to serve as new evidence was doubted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. Moreo-
ver, the tribunal stated that Pechstein had already argued before that her irregular 
blood-values were caused by a genetic aberration. Hence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
found that the challenge of the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was not 
justified as it only aimed to achieve a second review of the same facts.116 In Septem-
ber 2010 the review was dismissed.  
 
3. The proceeding at the Regional Court Munich  
After the refusal at the supposed courts for sport disputes, Pechstein tried to sue the 
International Skating Union and the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft for dam-
ages before German state courts. Whilst the International Skating Union imposed the 
doping ban of Pechstein, the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft was involved in 
its enforcement. Pechstein requested that the court declare the doping suspension 
illegal and claimed monetary compensation for lost profit as well as for pain and 
suffering. 
In order to justify its own jurisdiction and hence the admissibility of the claim, the 
Regional Court Munich had to examine the validity of the arbitration agreements 
signed by Pechstein. In this context both skating unions argued that Pechstein was 
bound to the arbitral jurisdiction and its review as well as by the arbitral award with 
res judicata effect. In contrast to this, Pechstein argued that she signed the arbitration 
agreements involuntarily as it was the only option for her.117 The Regional Court 
Munich examined the two different arbitration agreements under the respective law 
of the place where the arbitration was agreed on. Therefore, the arbitration agreement 
with the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft was assessed under German law 
whilst the agreement with the International Skating Union was evaluated under Swiss 
law. The court held that under German law in situations of an obvious imbalance 
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between the contractual parties, the freedom of contract can be restricted and its out-
comes adjusted according to article 138(1) of the BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 
whilst under Swiss law the provision of article 27(2) ZGB (Zivilgesetzbuch) prohib-
its an excessive bound of one of the parties. This excessiveness was reasoned with 
the guarantee of access to justice in section 6(1) ECHR (European Convention on 
Human Rights). The importance of this right requires that it can only be waived vol-
untarily. However, in the light of the already examined monopolistic structure of 
sport federations, athletes have no real choice other than signing such an agreement 
in order to practice their sport professionally and compete internationally. Thus, the 
voluntariness of the arbitration agreement which in the view of the court is required 
under both legal systems, was not fulfilled. Neither was it necessary to object to the 
agreements as they were void anyway. Nonetheless, the Regional Court Munich held 
that it could not judge the lawfulness of the doping suspension. According to the 
judges, the fact that Pechstein and her lawyers entered the proceedings at the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport without challenging the arbitral proceeding gave legal force 
its decision.118 
  
4. The proceeding at the Higher Regional Court Munich  
Pechstein appealed against the Regional Courts rejection of her claim for compensa-
tion against the International Skating Union. However, she accepted the rejection 
regarding her claims against the Deutsche Eisschnelllauf-Gemeinschaft. The Higher 
Regional Court Munich (Oberlandesgericht München) confirmed the invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement between the International Skating Union and Pechstein. In con-
trast to the reasoning of the Regional Court however, the Higher Regional Court did 
not justify the invalidity because of provisions of the civil law but because of provi-
sion of the competition law119. The sole involuntariness of the arbitration agreement 
does not necessarily make the arbitration agreement void.120 In fact, there are good 
reasons for the mandatory arbitration agreements as they ensure a uniform way of 
dispute settlement and hence equal opportunities for the athletes. Nevertheless, if the 
athlete had a real choice between a neutral and impartial structured arbitration pro-
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120 Claudia Pechstein v The International Skating Union (2015) U 1110/14 Kart reprinted in 
SchiedsVZ 2015, 40. 
 30 
ceeding and the one of the federation favouring structured Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, the athlete would very likely choose the neutral one. Therefore, the mandatory 
jurisdiction of the imbalanced structured Court of Arbitration for Sport constitutes a 
misuse of the monopolistic position of the International Skating Union which makes 
the arbitration agreement void under German competition law.121 The assumption of 
an unbalanced structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport was mainly based on the same arguments that were 
given in the evaluation of the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in 
this thesis. Especially the composition of the list of arbitrators disregards the interests 
of the athletes and hence confirms the impartial nature of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport.122  
Additionally, the Higher Regional Court Munich disagreed with the ruling of the 
Regional Court of Munich in terms of the legal force of the ruling of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport. The recognition of the decision of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport would affect the public order as the misuse of the monopolistic position of the 
International Skating Union constitutes a violation of fundamental elements of the 
German legal system. The recognition of such an unlawful ruling would keep up this 
misuse and therefore contravenes the purpose of the provisions of the competition 
law.123 
 
5. The proceeding at the Federal Supreme Court of Germany  
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany overruled the decision of the Higher Re-
gional Court Munich by declaring Pechstein’s claim inadmissible because of a valid 
arbitration agreement.124 
The Court stated that although the International Skating Union has a monopolistic 
position, the question of misuse of this position depends on a general balancing of 
interests, which according to the judges did not justify the assumption of a misuse by 
the International Skating Union. In fact, the court accepted the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport as a true court of arbitration which in the face of the establishment of the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport and the related structural reforms is 
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independent enough to guarantee a fair trial to the opponents. The composition of the 
list of arbitrators does not alter the fact that the Court of Arbitration for Sport and its 
particular formations are sufficiently impartial as the interests of the athletes do not 
necessarily contravene those of the federations. The court stated that the fight against 
doping is rather in the interests of both. Moreover, the possibility of a uniform and 
fast-reacting dispute settlement body brings benefits for the federations as well as for 
the athletes. Any remaining doubts about the impartiality of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport are removed by the rules of procedure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
which ensures the independence and neutrality of the panel. The opportunity to ac-
cess the Swiss Federal Tribunal emphasizes the sufficiently granted rights of the ath-
letes. Whereas a right to access the national courts of Germany for a review of the 
already decided case does not exist.125  
Subsequent to the decision Pechstein and her lawyers announced that they will bring 
the case to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany whose judgment is still 
pending.  
 
IV.  Analysis of the case 
The case of Pechstein vs. the International Skating Union is probably the most im-
portant legal dispute in sports since the reform of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
in the aftermath of the Gundel decision. With its decision that mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses should generally be void, the Regional Court Munich initially 
questioned the whole system of arbitration in sports. Based on this assumption, a 
uniform handling of all sport related disputes would have been impossible to ensure. 
In contrast to this, the decision of the Higher Regional Court Munich suggested that 
such mandatory arbitration clauses could be valid if the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport finally provided an impartial and neutral arbitral procedure by reforming its 
structure once again. The Federal Supreme Court Germany however, disagreed with 
this view and held that because of the establishment of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport the composition of the Court of Arbitration for Sport does not 
justify the assumption of the invalidity of such arbitration agreements. The pending 
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany is awaited with interest.  




Ultimately, the legal reasoning for these different decisions must be precisely ana-
lysed in order to ultimately evaluate the validity of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses. In this context there are mainly two questions that must be answered and on 
which the national courts of Germany disagreed: First, does the lack of alternatives 
for the athletes and the resulting involuntariness of such arbitration agreements nec-
essarily make these agreements void? And if not, does the quality of the procedure at 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport result in the invalidity of such agreements?  
 
1. General invalidity of involuntary arbitration agreements 
In the first instance of the proceedings at the national courts of Germany the Region-
al Court Munich held that mandatory arbitration agreements with athletes are void 
per se as they contravene the principle of voluntariness in arbitration.126 In this con-
text the court precisely illustrated the lack of alternatives for the athletes and the im-
balance of powers of the contractual parties. According to its decision, the im-
portance of the right of access to the court which is ensured by the German Constitu-
tion (Grundgesetz)127 as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights128 
requires the arbitration agreement to be completely voluntary. Therefore, a decision 
made without any serious alternatives cannot bind a party to an arbitration agree-
ment.  
In contrast to this, the Higher Regional Court Munich stated that despite this involun-
tariness, arbitration agreements could be valid if the court of arbitration and its pro-
ceeding guarantees a fair trial to both parties as required by the right of access to the 
court. Notwithstanding its different findings regarding the fair trial with respect to 
the independence and impartiality of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the Federal 
Supreme Court of Germany at least confirmed this statement of the Higher Regional 
Court Munich. The special features of sports such as its internationality and its fast-
moving nature as well as the need for a uniform and consistent handling of all sport 
disputes require a prescribed arbitral jurisdiction in order to maintain the functionali-
ty of sports in general. This legitimate purpose is in accordance with the interests of 
the athletes as they depend on such a functioning sport system and its uniform rules 
in order to exercise their sport professionally. Nevertheless, such a sport system and 
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more than anything its dispute settlement body - the Court of Arbitration for Sport - 
needs to fulfil the standards of a fair trial in respect of the requirements of independ-
ence and impartiality. Only then, the voluntariness of the arbitral agreement can re-
cede into the background as the need for the protection of the right of a fair trial is 
ensured anyway.  
This finding is also consistent with the German law as article 11 of the recently 
passed anti-doping law (Anti-Doping-Gesetz) recognizes the right of the federations 
to insist on an arbitration agreement as a necessary condition for participation in its 
competitions. Moreover, in 1998 article 1025(2) of the code of civil procedure (Zi-
vilprozessordnung) was removed which originally ruled that an arbitration agreement 
is void if one of the party uses its economic or social power to force the other party 
to agree on the arbitration. This general change was justified by the reasoning that 
under the premise of a balanced composition of the court of arbitration and a fair 
trial, such an arbitral procedure cannot constitute a disadvantage for any of the par-
ties.129 
Therefore, the first-instance ruling of the Regional Court Munich in this respect is 
too general. If pre-dispute arbitration clauses in general are permitted, then the sole 
superiority of one party or its stronger negotiation position cannot affect the validity 
of the arbitration agreement just by itself. In fact, a certain degree of imbalance in the 
negotiation of an agreement for example between a commercial enterprise and pri-
vate individual is a typical characteristic of negotiations. Therefore, the crucial aspect 
in this matter is not the imbalance of powers during the negotiation of the pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement but the imbalance of powers during the arbitral procedure it-
self. Consequently, a mandatory and hence involuntary arbitration agreement can be 
valid, as long as the arbitral system provides a fair trial for the disputing parties. 
However, if the arbitration system or its dispute settlement body is structured in an 
imbalanced way or if the way of negotiation constitutes a breach of the law such as 
the misuse of a monopolistic position does, the arbitration agreement nevertheless is 
void.  
This even more applies for licence contracts containing a mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreement. In the face of the special requirements of sports law, mandatory 
and hence involuntary arbitration agreements between the athletes and their federa-
tions can still be valid as long as the Court of Arbitration for Sport provides a fair 
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and independent procedure in terms of the standards of the right to a fair trial codi-
fied by the European Convention130 of Human Rights as well as by the German Con-
stitution131. 
 
2. Invalidity based on the structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Since the validity of mandatory arbitration agreements thus depends on the quality of 
the provided system of arbitration, the different assessments of the Higher Regional 
Court Munich and the Federal Supreme Court of Germany have to be considered. 
In the face of the above examined question of sufficient independence of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport and the concluded lack of such independence, the latest deci-
sion of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany seems to be unreasonable.  
Firstly, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany partly relied upon wrong facts as a 
basis for its considerations.132 The judges assumed that the president of the of the 
particular formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in a procedure of the Ap-
peals Arbitration Division was only appointed by the president of the Appeals Arbi-
tration Division if the parties cannot agree on a president of the formation by their 
own.133 However, according to section 54 of the Code of Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, in the case of an Appeals Arbitration procedure, the president of the formation 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport is always directly chosen by the president of the 
Appeals Arbitration Division.134 This incorrect factual assumption regarding the 
composition of the panel could possibly have had an impact on the assessment of the 
independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  But even besides that, the find-
ings of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany do not convince in other respects as 
well.  
Although the fight against doping in theory might be in the interests of the federa-
tions as well as of the athletes, the reality is somewhat far from that. In fact, at the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, athletes and federations will usually be opponents 
disputing about contradictions regarding the realization of those doping rules for ex-
ample. If the composition of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport and 
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the Court of Arbitration for Sport with its list of arbitrators generally favours the in-
terests of the federations as it does at present, the requirements for a truly independ-
ent court of arbitrations are not fulfilled. 
By noting that sport federations unexceptionally act in the same interests as the ath-
letes, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany fails to recognize that the interests of 
the federations and its acting organs - just like those of the athletes - are not always 
as unselfish and beneficial for the fight against doping as they should be. In fact, in 
the light of the recent doping scandals in Russia135 and the bribery scandals at some 
sport federations136, a certain level of distrust against the supposedly good purposes 
of the federations seems to be more than appropriate. Instead the court’s decision 
naively gives freedom to the federations to act without any impartial and independent 
legal control. The mistake in this reasoning becomes even more evident if it is trans-
ferred to a more usual legal context: Nobody would disagree that an administrative 
court cannot be influenced by the public authorities just because the proper execution 
of the administrative system is in the supposed interests of all parties. The same logic 
applies to arbitration in sports law.  
In addition, under the understanding of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany the 
federations are free to fight doping by any means and at all costs including collateral 
damages because of collective punishments or suspensions despite unclear states of 
evidence as happened in the Pechstein case. Such a method however, even though it 
might be effective in preventing doping, contravenes the principle of a fair trial and 
most certainly does not match the interests of the athletes who thus - against the find-
ing of the Court - become victims of the structure of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport.  
Therefore, the imbalanced one-sided structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
cannot be considered independent enough to guarantee a fair trial to the opponents as 
the Federal Supreme Court of Germany assumed. Consequently, the result of the 
required balance of interests turns out differently and hence justifies the assumption 
that the International Skating Union misused its monopolistic position which makes 
the arbitration agreement void. The additional conclusion of the Higher Regional 
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Court Munich that the recognition of the legal force of such a judgement of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport would preserve this misuse is consequent and thus correct.  
 
V. Conclusion of the case study  
The case of Claudia Pechstein vs. the International Skating Union illustrates the im-
balanced structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as well as its effects and con-
sequences in practice. It demonstrates how single professional athletes from one day 
to the other can fall victim to the current federation-friendly system of arbitration for 
sport and how little they can do to prevent it. Claudia Pechstein was a flagship ath-
lete and world champion whose lifetime achievements have been destroyed by this 
system. It demonstrates how wrongful the sport federations under the current system 
can pursue their goals without any truly independent and impartial control if they can 
merely show that their purposes seem reasonable.  
 
1. Conclusion regarding the provided system of arbitration 
As shown for the fight against doping, the federations are free to pursue their inter-
ests without any control. This zealous behaviour can quickly become a burden to 
innocent athletes. A fair trial comparable to public systems of justice is not ensured 
in this way. This is underlined by the fact that the burden of proof for the origin of 
the increased blood values was borne by Pechstein who hence had to proof that she 
inherited a genetic aberration from her father. Such evidence however, is very hard to 
adduce. On the other hand, the International Skating Union did not have to prove that 
Pechstein took any forbidden substances. In fact, all the repeated doping-tests never 
found direct evidence for the ingestion of such prohibited substances. Instead, only 
the irregular blood values of Pechstein which could have been caused by both possi-
ble origins were enough to assume the ingestion of such substances and convict her 
for doping. Although this possibility of indirect evidence has been removed, it never-
theless is an example for the wrongfulness of the means which the federations can 
use to pursue their possibly even legitimate objectives without independent and im-
partial control.  
In addition, the current system of appeal at the Swiss Federal Tribunal does not ef-
fectively review the procedure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Instead, it rather 
upholds the assessments of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as it still considered it a 
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truly independent and impartial court of arbitration despite its current structure. 
Therefore, it seems to be very unlikely that this repeated evaluation will change and 
that the Swiss Federal Tribunal will critically reflect on the structure of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport. The Pechstein case confirms this suspicion. Although the prac-
tice of indirect evidence clearly is one-sided, disadvantageous and disproportionate 
in terms of a fair trial, the Federal Swiss Tribunal has not raised any concerns against 
this practice. In contrast to all of the three national courts of Germany, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal did not even examine the monopolistic position of the International 
Skating Union, not to mention the questionable independence of the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport.  
In summary, the case provided a clear and sobering example of how the examined 
structural imbalance in real-life affects the dispute between an athlete and its federa-
tion. It shows how disadvantaged a single athlete is against the common interests of 
the federations and the system of arbitration which favours these interests and their 
effective implementation. Moreover, it gives a warning of the possible consequences 
of such uncontrolled bias in favour of the interests of the federations. Against the 
assumption of the Federal Court of Germany, the interests of the athletes are general-
ly not the same as those of the federations and hence will not be represented equally 
and effectively if the structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport does not change. 
Until then, the recklessness of the sports arbitration system possibly ruins the careers 
of further innocent athletes for the good of the maintenance of the self-administered 
justice of the federations.  
 
2. Conclusion regarding the review by the German national courts 
Another important aspect of the Pechstein case is the way how the national courts of 
Germany reviewed the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. All three courts 
reached different decisions regarding the validity of mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses in sports. Whilst the Regional Court Munich held that such agreements 
are involuntary and thus void, the Higher Regional Court Munich as well as the Fed-
eral Supreme Court of Germany stated that such agreements can generally be valid if 
the federation which insists on the arbitration clause in the context of its licence 
agreement does not misuse its monopolistic position. In terms of this misuse, in turn, 
the two latter courts came to different conclusions. These inconsistencies emphasize 
the legal uncertainty about the validity of most of the arbitration agreements between 
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athletes and federations since these agreements usually are made in the same way. 
They once again show that the federations use their power to the maximum extent 
permitted by the law. Notwithstanding its legal assessment, the federations clearly 
pursue their own interests rather than trying to provide a fair and balanced system of 
arbitration. Therefore, the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration 
for Sport and the related reforms have not amounted to a real attempt to provide an 
independent and impartial dispute settlement body but a targeted measure to maintain 
the legal autonomy regarding sports law and its disputes without losing too much 
influence.  
Even though the German courts obviously ruled on a German law basis, the applied 
principles such as the guarantee of a fair trial, the right of access to the court and the 
freedom of contract are all general principles of law. Moreover, since the goal of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport is to achieve uniform standards for international legal 
sport disputes, the objectives which the Court of Arbitration for Sport is aiming for 
should include the fulfilment of the requirements for arbitration of all law systems. 
The differing findings of the Higher Regional Court Munich and the Federal Su-
preme Court of Germany also highlight the fine line of the balancing of interests in 
this matter.  
The considered special features of sports - such as its internationality, its need for 
uniformity and fast decisions as well as for specific expertise regarding the rules of 
several kinds of sports - in fact require a system of dispute settlement that satisfies 
these demands. The difficulty to bring these aspects in accordance with the guarantee 
of a fair trial has been the reason for the differing decisions of the two courts and 
finally also for the fate of Claudia Pechstein. Nevertheless, from this point of view, it 
would be too simple to just call for a general national jurisdiction for legal sport dis-
putes. In fact, the concept of arbitration perfectly serves to fulfil the special demands 
of sports law. Admittedly, it can well be argued like Kaufmann does, ‘that municipal 
judges possess the capabilities to handle disputes in the area of international sports 
law’ as they ‘constantly hear cases that cover an infinite spectrum of issues’ and on 
which they are no experts and ‘yet few would argue that a separate court system 
should exist for each and every legal topic’137. But nonetheless, the need for interna-
tional uniformity and fast decisions still constitutes special demands that can best be 
dealt with by arbitration.  
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After all, however, such arbitration system at the same time needs to guarantee a fair 
trial and in particular the independence and impartiality of the court of arbitration. As 
presented above, the Court of Arbitration for Sport does not yet ensure such a fair 
trial. For this reason, as long as the structure and the composition of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport is unreformed, national courts can consider the mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements to be invalid and hence assume their own jurisdiction 
for the dispute as happened in the Pechstein case at the Higher Regional Court Mu-
nich. How exactly these needs for a reformation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
could be met in order to bring the different demands in accordance will be examined 
in chapter E.   
 
D. Comparison: Assessment of the findings from a South African perspective 
Under South African law according to section 34 of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of 
the South African Constitution ‘everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’138 
The above considered general principle of the guarantee of a fair trial and the right of 
access to the court which in the Pechstein case was deduced from article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and article 101(1)(2) of the German Consti-
tution is hence given the same high importance under South African law. The provi-
sion mainly serves as a protection against the ousting of the jurisdiction of national 
courts due to ouster clauses in legislation which was a practice in the times of the law 
system of the apartheid.139 However, the possibility of alternative dispute settlement 
such as mediation or arbitration is not affected by this guarantee.140 Therefore, sport 
federations can only invoke these alternative ways and in particular arbitration if they 
want to avoid the national courts of South Africa to decide on their disputes.141  
For these reasons, the above discussed questions about the validity of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
are also rising from a South African view. As section 34 of the Bill of Rights guaran-
tees the right of access to the court in order to prevent the ousting of the jurisdiction 
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of national courts, arbitration agreements and their provided system of arbitration 
need to fulfil the requirements of such a fair trial in the same way as they need to 
fulfil them under article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and arti-
cle 101(1)(2) of the German Constitution. The balancing of this fundamental right on 
the one hand and the special features of sports and their juridical needs (which ap-
parently are the same in every country) on the other hand hence require a consistent 
assessment of this question. Therefore, the above concluded findings apply from a 
South African perspective to the Court of Arbitration for Sport as well.  
E. The future of arbitration in international sports   
The latest judgement of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany in the examined case 
of Claudia Pechstein against the International Skating Union clearly constitutes an 
important decision for the future of sports disputes and arbitration in sports in partic-
ular. The recognition of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as a sufficiently independ-
ent and impartial dispute settlement body which considers the interests of the federa-
tions as well as these of the athletes confirms the previous findings of the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal and strengthens the currently provided system of arbitration of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport. The scope of this assessment reaches far beyond na-
tional or continental borders and rather has global effect on international sports law 
and its arbitration system as it contributes to the worldwide acceptance of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport as an independent and impartial court of arbitration. These 
far-reaching implications indicate how ground-breaking a contrary decision against 
the validity of the mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses based on the lack of in-
dependence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport could have been. Therefore, the 
dispute between Claudia Pechstein and the International Skating Union has been an 
extraordinary opportunity for the German national Courts as well as for the whole 
sport community to urge the Court of Arbitration for Sport for another reformation of 
its structure for the benefit of a balanced arbitration system which considers the in-
terests of the athletes in the same way as those of the federations and hence is truly 
independent.  
The consequence of such a contrary decision would have been a breach of the uni-
formity of sports law. Within the scope of the jurisdiction of German courts, athletes 
could bring their legal disputes to the national courts of Germany and therefore pos-
sibly obtain different judgments than athletes in other countries which still would 
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have to bring their disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. However, it is not 
very unlikely that national courts of other countries would have followed the way of 
such a decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany up to a point where the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport had to reform its structure in order to regain uniformity 
and control over the legal disputes in international sports.  
Although the decision of the Constitutional Court of Germany remains to be seen, 
the present prospect for arbitration in international sports in the aftermath of the 
Pechstein decision by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany is clear. 
 
I. Prospect for arbitration in international sports 
In reality, arbitration in international sports is more dominant and powerful than ev-
er. The efforts to establish a separate and uniform dispute settlement body for sports 
recognized by the legal community seem to be ultimately achieved. The Court of 
Arbitration for Sport as well as the sport federations and organisations feel vindicat-
ed by the judgement of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany in the Pechstein case. 
Their strict methods to pursue their goal of an exclusive arbitration system for inter-
national sport by enforcing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements seem to be 
justified as they apparently even have the blessing of the national courts of Germany 
which they thereby successfully exclude from the jurisdiction in order to avoid the 
state control by such traditional courts.   
In the face of these developments and the general history of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport it seems to be highly unlikely that a new reform of the court will be striven 
for. In fact, if there should have been thoughts to improve the structure of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport in order to ensure its true independence, these reform efforts 
have been given up as a result of the Pechstein decision. Instead, the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport finds itself in a safe position of self-control instead of state control 
so that the court can further on act in a carefree way and without consideration of the 
interests of the athletes. Hence, the representation of these interests will most proba-
bly not improve any time soon. Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses will con-
tinually be used without hesitation and an athlete who thus becomes a party of a legal 
dispute at the Court of Arbitration for Sport can still only choose one arbitrator out of 
the prescribed list of arbitrators created by the federation dominated International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport.  
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Therefore, the strengthening of the provided system and its recognition only exists 
from the perspective of the legal community. The scepticism and concerns of the 
athletes do not end as they still feel uncomfortable and inconvenient with bringing a 
legal dispute to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Their subordination towards the 
powerful federations and organisations of sports is further on reflected by its system 
of arbitration and ignored by the ordinary courts. In contrast to this, the superior alli-
ance of interests comprising the global sport federations and organisations enjoys a 
great level of autonomy142 and hence is free to pursue their interests by any means 
possible.  
Accordingly, the establishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
and the related reforms regarding the reputed improvements of independence of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport from the International Olympic Committee and other 
federations achieved its true purpose, as presented above. The strategy of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee to rather drop its direct and obvious influence - at least to 
some degree - by pretending to aim for a completely independent and ‘athlete-
friendly’ court of arbitration in order to prevent the denial of the independent status 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport by the international legal community and hence 
the total loss of influence on the legal sport-proceedings, worked out well. 
Consequently, arbitration remains the prevalent way of dispute settlement in sports. 
This trend of exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration and its recognition by the legal 
community might serve the interests of international sports and its special features as 
it supports its uniformity and its entertainment value which are no longer at stake and 
threatened by inconsistent and slow-moving national jurisdictions. These benefits 
however, come at high costs and at the expense of the athletes which are deprived of 
their (constitutional) right of access to the court and the guarantee of a fair trial.  
In this context one has to bear in mind that the pursued goals and benefits could easi-
ly be achieved in another way without paying such a high price. The special needs of 
the dispute settlement in international sports law - which are after all best fulfilled by 
way of dispute settlement through arbitration - could be ensured to the same extent if 
the arbitration system was reformed in order to safeguard its independence and im-
partiality. An idea how such a reform and its particularly included changes could 
                                                
142 Andre M. Louw ‘An ‘anomaly tolerated by the law’: Examining the nature and legal significance of 
the International Sports Governing Body’ (2007) 22 SAPR/PL 210, 227. 
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look like is given in the following chapter which makes suggestions for improve-
ments of the current arbitration system in international sports. 
 
II. Suggestions for improvements of the international sport arbitration system 
‘It appears the [International Olympic Committee] has convinced most legal experts 
that the Court of Arbitration for Sport will make unprejudiced decisions in the cases 
it hears. Perhaps then the new challenge that lies ahead for the [International Olym-
pic Committee], is convincing athletes to take advantage of this dispute resolution 
system that was established primarily for their benefit’.143 This statement by Stephen 
A. Kaufmann comes straight to the point. The provided system of international sports 
arbitration still struggles for the appreciation of the athletes which comprehensibly 
do not feel represented and fairly treated by the court.   
For the purpose of maintaining an effective way of dispute settlement in sports and at 
the same time improving acceptance by the athletes as well as consistency with the 
fundamental right of a fair trial and access to the court, the only possible way for the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport is a reformation of its structure. 
As discussed above, there is more than one good reason for legal disputes in sports to 
be settled by way of arbitration. Nevertheless, the provided system of arbitration for 
international sports fails to fulfil the requirement of independence and thus of the 
fundamental right for a fair trial. Therefore, it could only claim legal validity if it was 
reformed. Such reformation would not only help the Court of Arbitration for Sport to 
gain acceptance by the athletes but also to ‘reinforce its legitimacy and protect its 
own institutional autonomy and independence’, as Foster noted144. Furthermore, in 
consequence of such a reform and the related warranty of independence mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements would no longer contravene the right of a fair trial 
as seen above. As a result of this, such arbitration agreements could legally constitute 
a mandatory condition for the participation in international sport competitions and 
therefore also ultimately ensure the uniformity of dispute resolution by way of arbi-
tration in international sports.  
                                                
143 Stephen A Kaufmann op cit note 54, 548. 
144 Ken Foster ‘Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Jurisprudence’ in 
Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
1984-2004 (2006) 420, 40. 
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The following suggestions for improvements of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
attempt to draw a system of arbitration for international sports which satisfies these 
different requirements in order to create an uncontroversial court of arbitration for 
sport.  
 
1. The funding of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
The first step to improve the independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport is to 
assure its financial autonomy by adjusting its funding system. Although the estab-
lishment of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport officially served to 
guarantee the financial independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport from the 
International Olympic Committee145, the Court of Arbitration for Sport still obtains 
his entire funding from the Olympic-governing bodies by receiving one-third from 
the International Olympic Committee, one-third from the International Federations, 
and one-third from the National Olympic Committees.146 Therefore, a restructured 
funding system providing alternative funding methods would help to reduce the de-
pendence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport from the Olympic Movement. One 
possibility for such a modification of the funding could be an increase of the fees of 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport as suggested by Downie.147 However, such an in-
crease would once again burden the athletes and perhaps even keep them from bring-
ing their disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  
Thus, to provide an alternative funding system for the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
seems to be rather difficult. What is more, a one-sided funding system as is currently 
provided does not necessarily contravene the independence of the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport if other links between the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Olym-
pic Movement and its governing bodies can be removed.  
Alternatively, instead of obtaining the funding directly from the committees and fed-
erations, a special fee could be charged on the gains made at professional sport com-
petitions. As these amounts can be traced back on the performance of the athletes as 
well as on the achievements of the governing bodies, the funding would be obtained 
by both rather than one-sided. In addition, the fee would not burden the athletes as 
                                                
145 Darren Kane op cit note 14 at 618.   
146 Supra note 22.  
147 Rachell Downie ‘Improving the Performance of Sport’s Ultimate Umpire: Reforming the Govern-
ance of the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (2011) Melbourne Journal of International Law Vol 12, 22. 
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the amount otherwise would only raise the earnings of the organizations and commit-
tees. In that respect, in the end there would not be a significant change of the ultimate 
source of the funding but at least the method could help to strengthen the trust of the 
athletes as they would contribute to the funding as well. Thus, the suspicion of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport to be influenced or pressured by the Olympic Move-
ment in the light of its one-sided funding system could possibly be reduced in this 
way.  
 
2. The establishment of a ‘Union of Athletes’ 
Another suggested change in order to support the athletes’ acceptance of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport and at the same time reduce the extent of influence by the fed-
erations and organisations is to finally incorporate the representation of the interests 
of the athletes.  
The most obvious reason for the unbalanced structure of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport and thus for its lack of independence is the process of how the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport and the Court of Arbitration for Sport are composed. 
As presented above, the election of the members of the International Council of Ar-
bitration for Sport as well as the nomination of the list of arbitrators at the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport is mainly controlled by the federations and organisations. In 
particular, according to section 4 of the Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 60 
per cent of members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport are ap-
pointed by the committees of the Olympic Movement.148 
As illustrated earlier, even though section 4 of the Code of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport also contains a provision which implies the considerations of the interest of 
the athletes, there is still no guarantee of the representation of such interests as the 
provision only requires ‘appropriate consultation with a view to safeguarding the 
interests of the athletes’149. In fact, all of the remaining eight International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport members are chosen by those already elected members and 
therefore indirectly by the Olympic governing bodies as well. 
Furthermore, the members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport elect-
ed in this way are subsequently responsible for the creation of the list of arbitrators 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
149 Supra note 16, s 4(4). 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for the Court of Arbitration for Sport with the result that the influence of such federa-
tions and organisations even continues to have an effect on the exclusive appoint-
ment of the arbitrators of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  
A reform of the election system of the members of the International Council of Arbi-
tration for Sport members could therefore take effect up to the list of arbitrators as 
well. Such a reform would need to include the representation of the athletes’ interests 
in order to balance the possible influence of the potential parties to a dispute at the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport.  
However, since the athletes do not yet have a common voice to express and advocate 
their interests towards the federations and organisations it seems to be appropriate to 
establish a union of athletes150. The union’s goal would be to safeguard the interests 
of the athletes directly and not only by way of consultations whose outcome is lim-
ited and uncertain. It should be incorporated as another committee which participates 
in the election of the members of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
and consequently also has indirect influence on the appointment of the arbitrators.  
However, to determinate the exact and appropriate extent of its voting power in pro-
portion to the currently already entitled nominating sources (the International Federa-
tions, the National Olympic Committees and the International Olympic Committee) 
proves to be difficult. Although these federations and committees are separate bodies 
with partly different fields of interests, the ties between the different federations and 
organisations nevertheless are too tight and their goals too consistent to consider 
them as totally different groups of interests. Therefore, they should not each have the 
same power of voting as the entire group of athletes which is also practicing different 
kinds of sports and participating in diverse competitions and tournaments and though 
is considered as one group of interests. In fact, both of these two groups of interests 
should have the same extent of impact on the composition of the International Coun-
cil of Arbitration for Sport and hence also on the appointment of the arbitrators. 
What is more, the provision ruling that 20 per cent of members of the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport must be ‘chosen from among personalities independ-
ent of the bodies designating the other members of the ICAS’151 could even be ex-
panded as these are probably the most independent members of the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport.  
                                                
150 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1234. 
151 Supra note 16, s 4(4).  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A revised section 4 of the Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport could be read as 
follows:  
 
‘ICAS is composed of twenty members, experienced jurists appointed in the following man-
ner: 
1. two members are appointed by the International Federations (IFs), viz. one by the 
Association of Summer Olympic IFs (ASOIF) and one by the Association of the 
Winter Olympic IFs; 
2. two members are appointed by the Association of the National Olympic Committees 
(ANOC), chosen from within or outside its membership; 
3. two members are appointed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), chosen 
from within or outside its membership; 
4. six members are appointed by the Union of Athletes, chosen from within or outside 
its membership; 
5. eight members are appointed by the twelve members of ICAS listed above, chosen 
from among personalities independent of the bodies designating the other members 
of the ICAS.’ 
 
In addition, the union of athletes should be included in the consultation process re-
garding the election of the president of the Court of Arbitration for Sport by the In-
ternational Council of Arbitration for Sport prescribed by the Code of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport 152. 
With this change, not only the interests of the athletes would be represented at the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport to the same extend as those of the fed-
erations and organisations but also the general independence of the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport and hence its over-all acceptance and credibility would be greatly en-
hanced. These effects would even be reinforced by the fact that the now balanced 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport would than again - as it is provided 
anyway - appoint the arbitrators of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in an equally 
balanced way. Consequently, any concerns regarding the prescribed and exclusive 
list of arbitrators could be removed by this reform as well with the result that a better 
balance of the potential influences from the different groups of interests would be 
ultimately ensured.153  
                                                
152 Supra note 16, s 6(2).  
153 Michael Straubel op cit note 57. 
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3. The appointment of the formations of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Another discussed change regarding the composition of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport concerns the appointment of its particular formations. As presented earlier, the 
present practice of two party-appointed arbitrators and a third mutually agreed arbi-
trator in the end often leads to an appointment of this third arbitrator and president of 
the panel by the president of the respective division of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport who is appointed again by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport. 
The election of the panel’s president on which the International Council of Arbitra-
tion for Sport has indirect influence thus turns out to be the most crucial factor in the 
composition of the panel and possibly even in the decision of the dispute.  
What is more, the practice of party-appointed arbitrators enables the parties to choose 
biased arbitrators. However, the limitation of this choice to the prescribed list of arbi-
trators created by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport and the fact that 
single athletes might not have as good contacts to the listed arbitrators as the officials 
of the federations and organisations have, creates better chances for the latter to in-
fluence the bias of the panel.  
To remove this extensive link between the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport and the formations of the Court of Arbitration for Sport a lottery system for the 
appointment of arbitrators is discussed.154 Such a system would resolve any concerns 
in terms of the partiality or the bias of the arbitrators. However, the current system 
provides party-appointed arbitrators because this way of appointment gives the secu-
rity to the parties of having an advocate on the panel rather than risking to have no 
representative on it at all.155 As the aim of the suggested reform is to improve the 
trust and acceptance of the athletes towards the Court of Arbitration for Sport, such 
security should not be withdrawn. Furthermore, the appointment of arbitrators by the 
parties is a traditional practice of arbitration that has prevailed for a long time and in 
several fields of arbitration such as commercial arbitration.156  
For these reasons, Straubel suggests a combined system of arbitrator appointment 
which considers parties’ need for the security of choosing one of the arbitrators each 
                                                
154 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1237. 
155 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1238. 
156 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1236; Scott Donahey ‘The Independence and Neutrality of Arbi-
trators’ (1992) 9(4) Journal of  International Arbitration 31, 39–40.  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but nevertheless at least increases the chance of having a neutral president as the 
third member of the panel.157 These two requirements could be fulfilled if only such 
president of the formation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport was chosen by lot 
whilst the other two members are still appointed by the parties. Such a composition 
of the panel ‘would retain the security of appointing a friendly arbitrator, while re-
ducing the insecurity (particularly from the athlete’s perspective) of the swing vote 
arbitrator being selected by an institution that the parties may not trust.’158 
Although this approach seems to be reasonable, in the face of the above proposed 
reformations of the composition of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport, 
the trust in such institution should be improved anyway. The possibility of indirect 
influence of the federations and organisations through a biased International Council 
of Arbitration for Sport would no longer exist. Instead, because of the representation 
of the athletes through the union of athletes and their participation in the election of 
the International Council of Arbitration for Sport, the reform would constitute a bal-
anced International Council of Arbitration for Sport which can be trusted by the ath-
letes in the first place. Therefore, a change of the system of appointment of the arbi-
trators in the above suggested way could additionally add a certain degree of inde-
pendence to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. However, such an adjustment would 
not necessarily be required as the above suggested change of the composition of the 
International Council of Arbitration for Sport already serves for the same purpose.  
 
III. The realisation of the suggested improvements 
However, as illustrated earlier, in the face of the decision of the Federal Supreme 
Court of Germany in the Pechstein case and the increasing recognition of the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport by the legal community, the latest developments do not raise 
expectations that such a reformation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport seems to be 
realistic in the foreseeable future. The Court of Arbitration for Sport most certainly 
will not reform its structure by itself and with no need to do so. Neither will the In-
ternational Olympic Committee nor any other organisation or federation promote a 
process which removes their opportunity to exercise influence over the composition 
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and hence possibly even over its proceedings.  
                                                
157 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1238. 
158 Michael Straubel op cit note 57 at 1238. 
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As seen in the context of the Gundel decision, athlete-friendly improvements can 
apparently only be achieved if certain interests of the International Olympic Commit-
tee or other federations are at stake. In such situations of pressure the federations 
usually pretend to act for the benefit of the athletes but instead actually rather pursue 
their own interests. This practice can be observed within the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport as well. In the case of the South African Paralympic 
sprint star Oscar Pistorius159 for instance the Court of Arbitration for Sport upheld 
the athlete’s appeal against a ruling of the International Association of Athletics Fed-
erations which banned Pistorius from professionally competing against able-bodied 
athletes because of the use of a special prosthesis known as the 'Cheetah Flex-
Foot'.160 However, even in this remarkable and ostensibly athlete-friendly decision 
the panel explicitly stated that the ruling was limited to the eligibility of Pistorius 
only and had no general effect.161 The limitation of the decision’s effect raises the 
suspicion that the actual pursue of the decision was not to prevent discriminatory 
bans and create legal certainty about the use of the prosthesis but to keep Pistorius 
competing against able-bodied athletes as he was a spectacular and popular sport 
star. In this way, the IOC used its opportunity to publicly show its equal treatment of 
handicapped athletes without risking to set a precedent. 
In the face of this strategy, an athlete-friendly structure of the Court of Arbitration 
can probably only be achieved by pressuring the International Olympic Committee to 
reform the structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport once again in order to main-
tain its exclusive jurisdiction of sports-related legal disputes. Therefore, a judgment 
of a major court in an important sport nation would be required to set the ball rolling, 
questioning the recognition of the Court of Arbitration for Sport as a truly independ-
ent court of arbitration by the legal community. As the Federal Supreme Court of 
Germany missed the opportunity to do so, such a decision seems to be very unlikely. 
What is more, such a decision would bring the respective nation at risk to get left out 
from international sports because of its inconsistent legal position. Thus, according to 
the slogan ‘the first follower makes the leader’ it would not only need such a land-
mark decision but also subsequent decisions of further courts in other nations to se-
cure that the pioneering state would not be isolated in international sports. Only then 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport would be forced to reform its structure in order to 
                                                
159 Pistorius v IAAF (2008) CAS 2008/A/1480. 
160 Andre M. Louw op cit note 140 at 190. 
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re-establish the required uniformity of dispute settlement in international sports. 
However, such a process is very hard to launch as its course is unpredictable. Alt-
hough it is very unlikely that a reform like the suggested one will be realised, it 
would still constitute a huge advantage for international sports in general in the long 
run. As Michael Novak noted: ‘Sports events do not really exist at all unless there is a 
certain order and fairness - justice in each event.’162 
F. Conclusion 
The special features of sports - such as its fast-moving nature and its global competi-
tion - indeed require a dispute resolution system that delivers quick and international-
ly uniform decisions. These criteria are best met by a mandatory dispute resolution 
system of international arbitration. Therefore, the Court of Arbitration for Sport gen-
erally is the appropriate platform for the settlement of sports-related legal disputes. 
Its creation and development has been a remarkable process which has not come to 
an end yet.  
However, it has been the argument of this dissertation that the mandatory nature of 
the pre-dispute arbitration agreements included in the licence contracts and athlete 
agreements contravenes the general principle of voluntariness of arbitration. Never-
theless, as illustrated by the case study of Claudia Pechstein against the International 
Skating Union (and as confirmed by the decisions of the Higher Regional Court of 
Munich as well as by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany) such mandatory and 
hence involuntary arbitration agreements could still be valid if the provided system 
of arbitration meets the requirements of the fundamental right of access to the court 
and a fair trial as required, among others, by the German Constitution163, the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights164 as well as by the South African Bill of Rights. 
However, the assessment of the Court of Arbitration for Sport prevailed that the ex-
isting system of arbitration for international sports currently does not meet these re-
quirements in a sufficient manner. In fact, the ties between several sport federations 
and organisations and their common interests in their capacity as bases of the Olym-
pic movement create a formidable power towards an athlete acting alone. It has been 
argued that the composition of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport fa-
                                                
162 Michael Novak The Joy of Sports: End Zones, Bases, Baskets, Balls, and the Consecration of the 
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163 Supra note 127. 
164 Supra note 38. 
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vours the common interests of the superior federations and organisations by allowing 
them to effectively appoint all of the members of the International Council of Arbi-
tration for Sport. In contrast to this, there is still no guarantee for the representation 
of the interests of the athletes. As a result of this unbalanced structure, the superior 
federations and organisations are in a position to indirectly influence the appointment 
of the arbitrators nominated in the exclusive list of arbitrators at the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport, the election of the presidents of the Ordinary Arbitration Division and 
of the Appeals Arbitration Division and thus last but not least in many cases also the 
appointment of the crucial president of the particular formation Court of Arbitration 
for Sport which finally decides the individual dispute.  
For this reason, it has been noted in this dissertation that - against the findings of the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal and the Federal Supreme Court of Germany - the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport is not a truly independent court of arbitration and that its pro-
vided system of arbitration contravenes the fundamental rights of a fair trial and ac-
cess to the courts. Under these conditions, the mandatory and thus involuntary arbi-
tration clauses in athlete agreements and licence contracts cannot be considered as 
being valid so that the jurisdiction of national ordinary courts is not effectively ex-
cluded for disputes arising from sports. 
In the face of this currently unbalanced structure of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
and the resulting lack of independence and impartiality, the only possible way to 
fulfil the need for a fast-acting and internationally uniform dispute resolution system 
for international sports and at the same time to ensure the fundamental rights of a fair 
trial and access to the court, is to reform the current system of arbitration and its legal 
framework. Only in this way will the two different challenges for such a mandatory 
court of arbitration for sport-related legal disputes would be met at the same time. 
Such a reform should include the above suggested changes regarding the funding of 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the composition of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport as well as the composition of the particular panels. The consid-
eration and representation of the athletes’ interests in such a reformed structure of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport would finally ensure a balanced, independent and im-
partial system of arbitration which would help the Court of Arbitration for Sport to 
gain the trust and acceptance of the athletes for whom it was created in the first place 
and hence to unlock its potential as an ideal alternative body of dispute settlement.  
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However, despite this assessment of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the sug-
gested reforms regarding its structure, in the light of the latest decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court of Germany and the settled case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
such a reform seems to be very unlikely. In this context, the Gundel decision clearly 
demonstrated that the Court of Arbitration for Sport will not reform its structure by 
itself but that a landmark decision of a major court in an important sports nation is 
required to cause such a reformation. Unfortunately, the Federal Supreme Court of 
Germany in the Pechstein case missed its opportunity to set the ball rolling and pres-
sure the Court of Arbitration for Sport towards such a reform. It can only be hoped 
that the upcoming decision of the Constitutional Court of Germany turns the current 
process upside down and radically changes the view of the legal community towards 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport and its provided system of arbitration for sports. 
Only then, one of the basic principles of sports can be ensured for its legal disputes 
as well: Fair play. 
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